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Living Under the Boot: Police Militarization and
Peaceful Protest
Charlotte Guerra*
But always . . . always there will be the intoxication of power,
constantly increasing and constantly growing subtler. Always, at
every moment, there will be the thrill of victory, the sensation of
trampling on an enemy who is helpless. If you want a picture of the
future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face—forever.1

I. INTRODUCTION: THE BOOT
In the modern era, it is almost taken for granted that our state and local
police have increasingly taken on the appearance and mannerisms of an
occupying force. According to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
“American policing has become unnecessarily and dangerously
militarized.”2 Part of this increased militarization has been a combative
attitude officers have extended towards citizens. Complaints about use of
force have become almost a daily concern.3 According to one report,
between 2003 and 2008, internally-generated excessive force complaints
had more than doubled (the number of citizen-generated complaints
* Charlotte Guerra is a student at Seattle University School of Law, class of 2016. The
author would like to thank all of her professors for their guidance and support and, in
particular, Professors Brooke Coleman, Deirdre Bowen, Sara Rankin, and Dean Spade.
Kathryn Barnhouse, Matt Geyman, and Judge John Erlick have also been wonderful
mentors during the author’s legal career. They have all been positive role models for the
profession and for social change. The author would also like to thank Professor Deborah
Ahrens for consulting on this paper’s topic in its early stages.
1
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 155 (1949).
2
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION 2
(2014), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-warcomeshomereport-web-rel1.pdf [hereinafter ACLU].
3
See, e.g., Bruce Taylor et al., Changes In Officer Use of Force Over Time: A
Descriptive Analysis of a National Survey, 34 POLICING 211, 211–32 (2011).
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remained stable),4 although actual officer injuries remained fairly
unchanged (still being only about half as common as suspect injuries).5 This
use of force is in excess of the appropriate courses of action afforded to a
police force meant to protect citizens. The rights of citizens in both public
and private spheres have been encroached by a police force that seems to
care little about the erosion of civil liberties. As recent events in Ferguson,
Missouri, and elsewhere have shown, in no other context is this quite as
apparent as when direct confrontation occurs in the process of peaceful
protest.
The erosion of civil liberty by police action in the context of protest
should be a source of concern for all citizens. Dependability and trust are
vested in the police force to uphold the laws and protect citizens. A certain
level of force is seen as necessary to keep the peace and for officers to carry
out their duties effectively. However, when police action impedes on civil
liberties like the right to peaceful assembly and protest, and it is perceived
that the trust placed in the police has been breached, the system does not
work effectively. This is because lives, property, and the public peace might
be threatened. The principle is especially important in the context of
peaceful protest. When a crowd has already been incited to an agitated state
to the point of constitutionally protected protest, police reaction and
methodology may make the difference between a dialog and a riot. As
President Kennedy stated, “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible
will make violent revolution inevitable.”6 As the recent protests that began
in Ferguson have highlighted, the current script for a peaceful revolution is
corrupted. If a state or locality can give a better alternative, American
society as a whole stands to gain. To protect the integrity of the police
4

Id. at 225–26 (there were also twice as many citizen-generated complaints as internallygenerated complaints).
5
Id.
6
John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, Address on the First Anniversary of
the Alliance for Progress (Mar. 13, 1962).
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profession and to ensure the constitutional civil liberties of our citizens,
reform is necessary.
In 2011, the Department of Justice (DOJ) found, after an extensive
investigation, that the Seattle Police Department (SPD) “has engaged in a
pattern or practice of excessive force that violates the Constitution and
federal law”;7 that the police force lacked adequate training for use of force;
that supervisors failed to provide oversight on officers’ use of force; and
that supervisors did not provide clear directions and expectations.8 The DOJ
and SPD reached a settlement agreement of terms on July 27, 2012.9 As of
mid-2015, the SPD had reportedly improved in several regards based on a
Department of Justice assessment of police, although “significant work
remains to be done.”10 Nevertheless, an internal memorandum claimed that
Seattle police are not using enough force as of late-2014, and over 100
Seattle police officers filed a federal lawsuit for their right to defend
themselves.11 These actions generate a question of sincerity and
demonstrate that there might be a disconnect between the police
department’s policies in compliance with the DOJ and the department’s
actual practices.12 In line with SPD’s stated dedication to change, and to
better safeguard Seattle citizens’ civil liberties, this paper has several

7

Investigation Documents: Investigation of the Seattle Police Department, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/investigation-documents (last visited Oct. 11, 2015).
8
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT 2–19
(Dec. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/16/spd_findletter_12-1611.pdf.
9
Investigation Documents, supra note 7.
10
SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, FOURTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT 13 (2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/12/19/spd_fourthrpt_12-14.pdf.
11
Renee Lewis, Seattle Police Aren’t Using Enough Force, Internal Memo Says,
ALJAZEERA AMERICA (Sept. 26, 2014),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/26/seattle-police-force.html.
12
See id.
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suggestions as to better effectuate that change and create a model police
force to decrease the number of violent police interactions with the public.
The militarization of the police has had a unique interplay with this
country’s racial dynamics. According to the ACLU, the militarization of
law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and the use of “paramilitary weapons and
tactics” have primarily impacted minorities.13 At the time of writing, a large
component of the current protests concerned perceived racial inequalities
and police interaction with minority groups, especially black citizens. Late2014 alone had several high profile cases in which officers killed unarmed
black citizens. Cleveland police officers killed Tamir Rice, a 12-year-old
boy, within seconds of the police cruiser pulling into the park where the boy
was playing with his toy, non-lethal airsoft gun.14 John Crawford III was
carrying an air rifle he had just picked up off of the shelf when police
officers shot him in a Wal-Mart outside of Dayton, Ohio.15 New York City
police officers killed Eric Garner while he was being held in an illegal
chokehold.16 South Carolina Officer Michael T. Slager killed Walter Scott
with multiple shots in the back as Mr. Scott fled, unarmed.17

13

ACLU, supra note 2, at 5.
Tamir Rice Video Shows Cop Opening Fire on 12-year-old, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov.
26, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/26/tamir-rice-video-showsco_n_6227552.html.
15
Elahe Izadi, Ohio Wal-Mart Surveillance Video Shows Police Shooting and Killing
John Crawford III, WASH. POST. (Sept. 25, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/09/25/ohio-wal-martsurveillance-video-shows-police-shooting-and-killing-john-crawford-iii/.
16
Josh Sanburn, Behind the Video of Eric Garner’s Deadly Confrontation with New York
Police, TIME (July 22, 2014), http://time.com/3016326/eric-garner-video-policechokehold-death/.
17
Thomas Barrabi, Walter Scott Shooting Video: Officer Michael Slager Arrested,
Charged With Murder In South Carolina, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015, 7:55 PM
EDT), http://www.ibtimes.com/walter-scott-shooting-video-officer-michael-slagerarrested-charged-murder-south-1873345.
14
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These are not isolated incidents, and accusations of racial profiling,
discriminatory practices, and racist policies persist across the nation.18
Racial issues may also be especially prevalent in high-stress environments,
such as those involving large groups of people who are currently protesting
some aspect of government. In Seattle, the DOJ noted its investigation
“raised serious concerns that some SPD policies and practices, particularly
those related to pedestrian encounters, could result in discriminatory
policing.”19 For instance, a tort claim was supposedly filed for an incident
involving Jesse Hagopian, a history teacher, who SPD allegedly pepper
sprayed while he was speaking on his cell phone moments after giving a
speech at an anti-police brutality rally on Martin Luther King, Jr. Day,
2015.20 These types of incidents are indicative of a pervasive problem, both
in Seattle and nationally, that touches on many aspects of both the right to
protest and the increased militarization of the police, on nearly every level
of application. However, race is a deep-seated and multi-dimensional issue,
and it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully address the impact of race.

18
See e.g., Redditt Hudson, Being a Cop Showed Me Just How Racist and Violent the
Police Are. There’s Only One Fix, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/12/06/i-was-a-st-louis-copmy-peers-were-racist-and-violent-and-theres-only-one-fix/.
19
Investigation Documents, supra note 7.
20
Ansel Herz, Watch Seattle Police Pepper Spray Teacher Jesse Hagopian on MLK Day,
STRANGER (Jan. 28, 2015, 3:17 PST),
http://slog.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2015/01/28/watch-seattle-police-pepper-sprayteacher-jesse-hagopian-on-mlk-day; see Ansel Herz, Reprimand for Seattle Cop Who
Pepper-Sprayed Jesse Hagopian, STRANGER (Sept. 14, 2015, 2:16 PST),
http://www.thestranger.com/blogs/slog/2015/09/14/22858334/discipline-recommendedfor-seattle-cop-who-pepper-sprayed-teacher-jesse-hagopian; OFFICE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY, CLOSED CASE SUMMARY: COMPLAINT NUMBER OPA#2015-0086 2–3
(2015), available at
http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/OPA/ClosedCaseSummaries/20150086ccs09-11-15.pdf (the officer’s use of force was “not reasonable, necessary or
proportional,” and the officer failed to direct force towards specific individuals posing a
threat).
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While police response to protest has become a national issue, actually
addressing the problem needs to come from individual states and police
departments. For the purposes of this paper, the emphasis will be placed on
Washington State, and particularly on SPD. This paper will use SPD as an
example of a police department that has a history of the use of excessive
force in the context of protest; policies initiated in Seattle have had a ripple
effect on police policy in reaction to protest nationwide, and SPD might be
used as a model for change. In terms of remedy, this paper will focus on
statewide and local statutory and regulatory change to return to Peelian
Principles21 of policing; alter police uniforms; create stricter sanctions for
complaints of excessive use of force; require police officers to wear “bodycams” on their persons; require reliable reporting of how many citizens are
harmed by police officers; ban or limit Washington police departments’
ownership of military-grade weapons; and limit the accepted methods of
non-lethal crowd control.
This paper will first briefly address the historical progression of
militarization of police departments and its interrelation with protest
response. This section will address: (1) the World Trade Organization
(WTO) protests in Seattle as an example and the model for future policecitizen contact during protest; (2) some of the sustaining governmental
programs behind this increased police militarization, the kinds of militarygrade equipment LEAs have been receiving, and how these agencies were
eligible to receive this equipment; and (3) culminating events and current
police response to peaceful protest, as in the example of the protests
currently occurring in Ferguson, Missouri, and elsewhere at the time of this
paper’s writing.

21

Sir Robert Peel’s Nine Principles of Policing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/nyregion/sir-robert-peels-nine-principles-ofpolicing.html?_r=1 [hereinafter N.Y. TIMES].
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The second half of this paper will focus on remedies, which include
statutory and regulatory change: (1) changing training methods on crowd
control to emphasize citizens’ rights of free speech and protest, decreasing
the number of altercations between civilians and police, and finding
alternative methods of resolution by returning to Peelian Principles of
policing that emphasize community policing and using force as a last resort;
(2) altering uniforms, such as through color changes, to decrease the risk of
confrontation between officers and civilians; (3) creating more rigid
enforcement—such as sanctions—when police officers face accusations of
excessive force or assault while either on-duty or off-duty, including a point
system that removes discretion from officers’ superiors and ultimately
results in termination if enough complaints are logged; (4) creating greater
police accountability to the public, such as through the use of tamper-proof
and reliable cameras worn on the officers’ persons; (5) requiring reliable
reporting on how many people are injured by police officers in both fatal
and non-fatal ways during police interaction; (6) banning or limiting
Washington police departments’ ownership of assaultive military-grade
weaponry; and (7) limiting the accepted methods of non-lethal crowd
control, especially where chemical weapons are concerned.

II. A BRIEF HISTORY: THE STAMPING
A. The World Trade Organization Conference Protests in Seattle: Setting
the Tone
In the present era, peaceful protest is subject to some limitations. Under
current Supreme Court jurisprudence, a state may impose restrictions on the
time, place, and manner of expression, whether it be oral, written, or
through conduct.22 Peaceful protest includes symbolic expression, like the
22

Nick Suplina, Crowd Control: The Troubling Mix of First Amendment Law, Political
Demonstrations, and Terrorism, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395, 397 (2005); Clark v. Cmty.
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
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Ferguson-inspired protest “die-ins”—where protestors lay on the ground in
public spaces as though they had been killed—to address police brutality
and racial profiling.23 The Supreme Court has articulated that First
Amendment rights for free speech and peaceful assembly are protected, and
states cannot restrict protest on the basis of the content of the speech (for
instance, when the speech is criticizing the state and the restriction is
targeted at silencing such criticism).24 Otherwise, when the court weighs
speech rights against state interests, the court gives the state deference.25
In the context of protest, this deference means that many symbolic forms
of expression that would have had greater effect if delivered at a specific
time, space, or manner, may be curtailed by the state if the rule was contentneutral.26 To give a modern example, after Michael Brown’s death kickstarted the Ferguson protests, demonstrations near his memorial and
candlelit vigils in his honor held much more symbolic significance than if
the protestors had congregated in, for example, a nearby parking lot.
However, the Court will usually find “content-neutral” restrictions
constitutional “provided that they are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information” they are trying to convey.27
However, to be considered “narrowly tailored,” it need not be the least
restrictive or intrusive means if the substantial government interest is still

23

Clark, 468 U.S. at 294; see also, e.g., Holly Yan, ‘Ferguson Is Everywhere’: More
Crowds Demand Action as Obama Lays Out a Plan, CNN (Dec. 2, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/02/us/ferguson-aftermath/.
24
See, e.g., Clark, 468 U.S. at 293; Suplina, supra note 22, at 399.
25
Suplina, supra note 22, at 399.
26
See id. at 405–07.
27
Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
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being met.28 This was already the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
expression rights going into the 1990s.
Towards the close of 1999, Seattle hosted the WTO Conference.29 The
widespread marches, protests, and the extreme police response—known as
the “Battle in Seattle”—became a “landmark moment in how police handle
protest in America,”30 primarily by way of shutting it down. On November
30, 1999, nearly 40,000 globalization protestors held demonstrations in the
streets and blocked many conference delegates from reaching the
convention site.31 Seattle had advance warning of the protestors’ intent, and,
in fact, had weeks of training.32 This was not a spontaneous event.
Nonetheless, the city was apparently unprepared for the protests’ sheer
size.33 Although the “vast majority of protesters were peaceful, obeyed the
police, and were not civilly disobedient,” the property damage, police
altercations, and panic at the government level resulted in the issuance of
three emergency orders that created daytime curfews and effective “noprotest” zones in the city, mandating the time, place, and manner of
permitted protest.34 Then-Mayor Paul Schell also criminalized personal
possession of gas masks, “an order that almost certainly exceeded his
authority and was probably unconstitutional.”35 After the mayor issued the
28

Suplina, supra note 22, at 402–03; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 798–99 (1989).
29
World Trade Organization Protests in Seattle, SEATTLE.GOV,
http://www.seattle.gov/cityarchives/exhibits-and-education/digital-documentlibraries/world-trade-organization-protests-in-seattle (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).
30
Radley Balko, After Ferguson, How Should Police Respond to Protests?, WASH. POST
(Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/08/14/afterferguson-how-should-police-respond-to-protests/.
31
Aaron Perrine, The First Amendment Versus the World Trade Organization:
Emergency Powers and the Battle in Seattle, 76 WASH. L. REV. 635, 635–36 (2001).
32
Id.
33
Id.; RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF
AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES 235 (2014).
34
Perrine, supra note 31, at 637–38.
35
BALKO, supra note 33.
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emergency order, police from around the state and the National Guard were
deployed, resulting in multiple altercations, mass arrests, and preemptive
SWAT raids.36 Police in full riot gear, rather than the more crowd-friendly
standard police uniform, were on the front lines.37
The officers’ actual actions may sound dishearteningly familiar at this
point. Officers liberally used tear gas, pepper spray, and rubber and plastic
bullets, apparently targeting both the press and the legal observers, while
herding the crowd through the streets.38 Observers noted that the police
wore neither badges nor identifying nameplates, which some believe may
have “emboldened” them through anonymity.39 According to one
eyewitness, the officers “offered no avenue of escape. It was an effort not to
disperse, but to punish the crowds.”40 The city’s actions were ultimately
deemed a violation of more than 170 protestors’ constitutional rights.41
According to an ACLU special report, citizens’ constitutionally protected
rights to protest “paid a dear price for poor judgment calls made by public
officials and police personnel every step of the way. The [c]ity must
acknowledge what went wrong and take actions to avoid similar mistakes in
the future.”42

36

Perrine, supra note 31, at 639–40; Balko, supra note 30.
BALKO, supra note 33, at 234.
38
Interview by Jim Compton with Joshua Alex, Law Student, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 9,
2000); telephone interview by Jim Compton with Tara Herivel, Legal Observer (Aug. 3,
2000); telephone interview by Jim Compton with Dick Burton, Philosophy Professor, at
Seattle Central Community College (Aug. 3, 2000); interview by Jim Compton of Nicole
Zimmer, Legal Observer, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 3, 2000).
39
Interview by Jim Compton with Isak Bressler, Legal Observer, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug.
3, 2000).
40
Telephone Interview by Jim Compton with Pavlovs Stavropolous, Computer Instructor
(Aug. 8, 2000).
41
BALKO, supra note 33, at 236.
42
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, OUT OF CONTROL: SEATTLE’S FLAWED RESPONSE TO
PROTESTS AGAINST THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 3 (2000), available at
https://aclu-wa.org/sites/default/files/attachments/WTO%20Report%20Web.pdf.
37
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Seattle’s response to protest set the tone across the nation for how the
states would interact with protestors through use of their police force for
years to come.43 The primary concern for police during protests would be
their own sense of control.44 For instance, on November 18, 2011, on the
University of California-Davis campus, protestors congregated as part of
the Occupy movement to protest state education funding cuts.45 Campus
police descended in riot gear and then pepper sprayed the seated, nonviolent protestors when they refused to disperse.46 Former Seattle Police
Chief, Norm Stamper, said:
[The WTO Protests in Seattle] set a number of precedents, most of
them bad. And police departments across the country learned all
the wrong lessons from us. That’s disheartening. So disheartening.
I mean, you look at what happened to those Occupy protesters at
U.C. Davis, where the cop just sprays them down like he’s
watering a bed of flowers, and I think that we played a part in
making that sort of thing so common—so easy to do now.47
Police are still grappling with the effects of these attitudes today, with
increased police aggression during protest only being further amplified by
policy and the increased presence of military-grade equipment.

43

Balko, supra note 30.
Id.
45
Elliot Burr, Los Altos Native Pepper-Sprayed at UC Davis Protests, LOS ALTOS TOWN
CRIER (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.losaltosonline.com/news/sections/news/215-newsbriefs/13174-J41706.
46
Id.; Adam Gabbatt, UC Davis Pepper Spray Police Officer Awarded $38,000
Compensation, GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/23/pepper-spray-cop-uc-daviscompensation. John Pike, the officer who performed the pepper spraying, was
subsequently awarded $38,000 in worker’s compensation for depression and anxiety over
the death threats he received for his actions. Id.
47
Balko, supra note 30.
44
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B. The Studied Increase in the Militarization of Police
The events in Seattle did not happen in a vacuum. Some have pointed to
the “unnecessarily and dangerously militarized” state of American police
forces accounting for the increased civil liberties erosion when it comes to
protest.48 Excessive militarization of the American police force has resulted
in officers viewing their jobs in an increasingly combative light that might
make them seek out more aggressive tactics in the direct confrontation that
protest generates.49 Police training encourages officers to think of
themselves as warriors and to see civilians as potential adversaries.50 The
emphasis has changed from protecting citizens and serving the community
to protecting police and preserving order.51 According to one Missouri
police chief, Betty Taylor, oftentimes the “us-versus-them mentality takes
over . . . [W]hen you get into that mentality, there are no innocent people.
There’s us and there’s the enemy.”52 The more we train and dress up local
law enforcement officers as soldiers, the more they will begin to act like
soldiers.
Part of the concern for police militarization relates to the ownership and
use of military-grade equipment by state and local peacekeepers against US
citizens. To scale back police militarization, the ACLU has looked to both
the stockpiling of military-grade equipment and the police training that
fosters a “warrior” mentality toward civilians.53

48

ACLU, supra note 2.
See id.
50
See id. at 3.
51
See Balko, supra note 30.
52
BALKO, supra note 33, at 241.
53
See ACLU, supra note 2, at 3.
49
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1. Military-Grade Equipment: The Department of Homeland Security
Grants and the 1033 Program
The military-grade weapons source for many LEAs in the United States
comes from either grants from the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) or from the Department of Defense Excess Property Program (1033
Program).54 LEAs were able to receive grants to fight against “terrorist
threats” after September 11, 2001, when the government, responding to the
World Trade Center attack, created the DHS.55 In 2011 alone, the DHS gave
$2 billion in grants.56 The department then “makes little effort to track how
the grants are spent,” to track the equipment bought with the funds, or even
to assess first whether the requesting agency may be facing any “tangible
threat of terrorism.”57 For instance, Fargo, North Dakota, has a population
of less than 116,000 people, and the closest foreign nation, Canada, is a US
ally.58 Nevertheless, Fargo has received $8 million in grants from DHS to
purchase “assault rifles, Kevlar helmets, and an armored truck with a
rotating turret.”59 Presumably, Fargo could purchase a wood chipper if its
police department could manufacture a use against local criminals.
Ultimately, DHS has given out “at least $34 billion in anti-terror grants
since its inception.”60

54
Linda Feldman, Ferguson: How Pentagon’s ‘1033 Program’ Helped Militarize SmallTown Police, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 16, 2014),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/0816/Ferguson-How-Pentagon-s1033-program-helped-militarize-small-town-police-video.
55
Id.
56
BALKO, supra note 33, at 255–56.
57
Robert Balko, Why is a SWAT Team Assaulting Me? I’m Just Dancing at a Rave,
SALON (Jul. 30, 2013),
http://www.salon.com/2013/07/30/why_is_a_swat_team_assaulting_me_im_just_dancing
_at_a_rave/.
58
Fargo (city), North Dakota, U. S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 8, 2014),
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/38/3825700.html.
59
Balko, supra note 57.
60
Id.
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In terms of the 1033 Program, the National Defense Authorization Act
(the “Act”) allows transferal of Department of Defense (DoD) property to
federal, state, and local departments.61 The program has been overseen
through the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO) within the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA) since 1995.62 Initially, the program was only
intended to assist against the War on Drugs, but as of 1997, any agency may
request the property for “bona fide law enforcement purposes that assist in
their arrest and apprehension mission,” with preference given for “counterdrug and counter-terrorism requests.”63 To be eligible, states create a
business relationship with the DLA through a Memorandum of Agreement,
and then the state governor appoints a state coordinator to maintain property
accountability records and investigate any alleged misuse.64 Once the state
coordinator and the LESO approve an LEA to participate in the 1033
Program, the LEA may appoint officials to obtain the equipment.65 Nearly
half a billion dollars worth of military equipment was given out in 2013
alone.66 In total, over $4.3 billion dollars worth of equipment has been
transferred since the 1033 Program’s inception.67

61

Federal Surplus, WASH. ST. DEP’T OF ENTERPRISE SERV. (Aug. 5, 2014)
http://www.des.wa.gov/services/Surplus/BuySurplus/Pages/FederalSurplus.aspx; 1033
Program FAQs, DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY,
http://www.dla.mil/DispositionServices/Offers/Reutilization/LawEnforcement/ProgramF
AQs.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2016).
62
1033 Program FAQs, supra note 61.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
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2. The Equipment
The amount and kind of military-grade equipment making its way into
local police departments’ hands is fairly staggering. For instance, the police
department in Maricopa County, Arizona, has over 21,000 types of military
equipment, including a .50 caliber machine gun that fires “bullets powerful
enough to blast through the buildings on multiple city blocks.”68 According
to the ACLU, the 63 responding agencies had received over 15,054 “battle
uniforms or personal protective equipment.”69 However, these responding
agencies are only a small fraction of the total LEAs in the country. More
than 8,000 LEAs have enrolled in the 1033 Program nationwide.70 This
figure does not include those who have otherwise received separate DHS
grants. In total, approximately 500 towns have received Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles.71 Other equipment included bomb
suits, night vision equipment, guns, rifles, surveillance and reconnaissance
equipment, utility trucks, GPS devices, helicopters, flashbang grenades, and
more.72
Washington State has not been immune to the siren call of sweet, sweet
federal funding. Seattle Police Chief Kathleen O’Toole made publicly
available a listing of the equipment received through the 1033 Program.73
Between 2006 and 2015, Washington received equipment through the 1033
Program totaling $20,945,358.57 in value.74 The equipment Washington
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State has requisitioned ranges from utility trucks, night vision equipment,
rifles, mine resistant vehicles, and more.75 The King County Sheriff’s
Department has acquired over $2 million in equipment, including
helicopters, armored trucks, and night vision equipment, while SPD has
acquired over $250,000 in equipment over the same time period.76
3. Acquisition and Eligibility
The process for acquiring the DoD property is fairly simple. To be
eligible to receive property, one needs to be a federal, state, or local LEA.77
The LEA can either physically visit a Defense Reutilization and Marketing
Office or review the inventory online through the Defense Reutilization and
Marketing Service.78 The weapon acquisition application differs depending
on the LEA, but may consist of a single page.79 The state coordinator
approves the request based on two criteria: “(1) that the agency intends to
use the equipment for a [‘]law enforcement purpose[’] . . , and (2) that the
transfer would result in a [‘]fair and equitable distribution[’] of property
based on current inventory.”80 Additionally, the Memorandum of
Agreement making LEAs eligible for the program also provides that the
item issuance should be no more than one per officer in the requesting
agency.81 In the ACLU’s two-year study, they did not discover a single
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The 1033 Program, JUSTNET, https://www.justnet.org/other/1033_program.html (last
visited Oct. 11, 2015) (the department then sends an application for the requested items to
their State Point of Contact (SPOC); upon SPOC approval, the application goes on to the
LESO).
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See Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) Weapon Request, TEX. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY,
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visited Feb. 20, 2016).
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denied equipment request.82 After the property is in the agency’s
possession, the DLA conducts a Program Compliance Review once every
two years.83 During the review, 20 percent of a state’s inventory is typically
physically reviewed; at random, any one site may be forced to account for
100 percent of 1033 Program “weapons, aircraft, watercraft and tactical
vehicles[,] and a minimum of 10 [percent] of all other controlled
property.”84 However, the only significant responsibilities placed on the
acquiring agencies are that they do not sell the equipment obtained and that
they maintain accurate inventories.85 Failure to conduct a required inventory
may result in a suspension from the program, “but there are no
consequences for overly aggressive use of equipment.”86
B. Culminating Events and Current Response to Protests
Ultimately, many of these factors have worked to culminate in some of
the widespread protests against police action that are currently underway at
the time of writing, and the atmosphere in this country is trending towards
mobilized political action in protest against what has been seen as
oppressive police conduct. While much of the current furor centers on
accusations of racial targeting, a widespread national discussion on police
militarization was also kick-started when officers responded for over three
months to primarily peaceful protest in Ferguson, Missouri, with tear gas,
rubber bullets, and military-grade weapons acquired through the 1033
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Program.87 Accusations that police escalated matters, targeted media, and
refused to wear required name tags88—much in the same manner as police
during the WTO protests89—has resulted in a concurrent federal inquiry into
events90 and at least one public apology from Ferguson Police Chief
Thomas Jackson.91 Attorney General Eric Holder responded to the situation
early on by emphasizing that police should be reducing tension, not
heightening it, respecting the rights of those who peacefully gather, and that
“journalists must not be harassed or prevented from covering a story that
needs to be told.”92 At the time of writing, the situation is still developing as
a recent grand jury failed to indict the officer.93 Citizens continue to voice
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See Amanda Terkel & Ryan J. Reilly, Fire Tear Gas at Protestors Hours Before
Curfew (UPDATE), HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/17/ferguson-protests_n_5686601.html; see also
Paige Lavender, Ferguson Protests Hit With Tear Gas, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 25,
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accusations of corruption and mishandling the situation, and the current
police response to peaceful protest is becoming a national debate.94

III. REPAIRING THE DAMAGE: THE HUMAN FACE
A. Returning to Peelian Principles
In some ways, the militarization of police can be combated by very
simple changes in how the police culture is cultivated. Rather than
emphasizing police officers’ roles as “warriors” and promoting an
atmosphere that will lead to more clashes with police when large groups
gather together in protest, society should be emphasizing police officers’
roles as “guardians.” Training should paint the police force in terms of its
community and the protection of civilians rather than seeing citizens as an
enemy or an obstruction.
Some have suggested a return to some of the principles of policing
suggested by Sir Robert Peel in the 19th century to create an ethical police
force.95 Among these Peelian Principles is the concept that the “approval
and trust of the public is vital in order for police to carry out their
mission.”96 The police do not live as separate entities from their
of Michael Brown (Nov. 24, 2014), available at http://us7.campaignarchive1.com/?u=b493e6c4d31beda32fdaf8e2d&id=73514e334b.
94
See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Findings of Two
Civil Rights Investigations in Ferguson, Missouri – Justice Department Finds a Pattern of
Civil Rights Violations by the Ferguson Police Department (Mar. 4, 2015), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-findings-two-civil-rightsinvestigations-ferguson-missouri (the DOJ found civil rights violations in the Ferguson
Police Department, including a pattern or practice of racial bias and violations of the
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments).
95
Timothy Roufa, Guardians or Warriors? The Changing Role of Law Enforcement,
ABOUT.COM, http://criminologycareers.about.com/od/Career_Trends/fl/Guardians-orWarriors-The-Changing-Role-of-Law-Enforcement.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2014).
96
Id.; N.Y. TIMES, supra note 21. There are nine chief principles including: (1) police
exist to prevent crime and disorder; (2) public approval of police actions is required for
police to fulfill their duties; (3) public cooperation to voluntarily observe the law is
necessary for police to secure and maintain the public’s respect; (4) greater cooperation
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communities. They are a part of the communities they serve; therefore, they
must adhere to the law like any other citizen, and force should only be used
as a last resort and “not the first reaction.”97 That mutual trust in
compliance, and respect for both the citizens and the law, is necessary for
the police to maintain order and prevent crime. Along those same lines, the
police force functions best—and has achieved its ultimate goal—if the
public is voluntarily complying with the law.98 The mission should not be to
put away as many people as possible, but to foster good citizenship and
self-policing. The absence of crime is the ultimate measure for the effective
police department.99
On the whole, many of these suggestions already comport with several
LEAs’ stated policy goals. Using SPD as a model, the department has seven
core principles related to their use of force, including looking to uphold
citizens’ constitutional rights while minimizing the need for use of force.100
“The community expects and SPD requires that officers use only the force
necessary to perform their duties and that such force be proportional to the
threat or resistance of the subject under the circumstances.”101 Looking to
proportionality, necessity, reasonableness, and de-escalation—policies the
consent decree reemphasized for the SPD102—aligns with Peelian Principles
that recognize the importance of the community’s expectations and the

requires less force; (5) public favor is garnered by impartial service to the law; (6)
physical force is a last resort and only used to the extent necessary; (7) the police is a part
of the public and the public is in the police; (8) police should direct their actions towards
their functions and not usurp judiciary powers; and (9) police efficiency can be measured
by the absence of crime.
97
Roufa, supra note 95.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Use of Force Core Principles, SEATTLE.GOV,
http://www.seattle.gov/police/publications/manual/08_000_Use_of_Force_Core_Principl
es.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Use of Force].
101
Id.
102
See SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, supra note 10, at 16–18.
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police force’s respect.103 However, the terminology still seems somewhat
skewed, in practice. “Necessary,” as defined by SPD, consists of “when no
reasonably effective alternative appears to exist,” where the reasonableness
inquiry requires judgment, not by a reasonable person standard, but “from
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene” (emphasis added).104
Similarly, the proportionality analysis for the use of force follows the same
reasonableness inquiry and looks to the “totality of the circumstances.”105
The manual very nearly quotes a 1989 Supreme Court decision to stress that
these inquiries must “allow for the fact that police officers are often forced
to make split-second decisions—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.”106 The inquiry is thus necessarily skewed towards what
seems reasonable in the insulated judgment of officers.
Unfortunately, looking to what might have been reasonable for a police
officer is still in line with several Supreme Court decisions and most trends
across the country when it comes to evaluating police conduct. In 1985, the
Supreme Court ruled in Tennessee v. Garner, using a Fourth Amendment
“objective reasonableness” test, that “where the officer has probable cause
to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to
the officer or to others,” such as if the suspect is armed, “it is not
constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.”107
This reasoning seems like it could be beneficial to unarmed citizens trying
to claim the use of force was unreasonable if they are fired upon when
attempting to escape. However, this “objective reasonableness” test was
given further definition just four years later when the Supreme Court ruled
103
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that the reasonableness of the force used “must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight.”108 In other words, the officer on the ground may have
the benefit of the doubt based on his or her perspective, even with fleeing,
unarmed citizens. The SPD Manual is thus in line with the Supreme Court
decisions.
However, the Supreme Court sets the floor, not the ceiling, on what
might be expected from officers in the line of duty. Local expectations
could be set either by codifying the standard under a “reasonable person”
rather than a “reasonable officer” standard,” or simply by changing training
methods for police to instead emphasize the Peelian Principle that force is a
last-resort option. The reasonable person, and not the reasonable officer,
might create a more objective standard that does not inherently favor the
police even by its phrasing. In any case, the law already would encompass
an officer’s unique perspective and the totality of the circumstances under a
plain reasonable person analysis. Using the standard of the “reasonable
officer” confounds several Peelian Principles relating to seeing the police as
part of the community and even the department’s own stated policy goals. It
creates a division between what may seem reasonable to any random citizen
in a community and what “cop-logic” may dictate. Police may agree on
what force is reasonable, but that is not necessarily a reflection of the
opinions of the communities they serve.
In practice, police often have very wide discretion in their use of force.109
In 2010, after a four-second warning, an SPD officer killed Native
American John T. Williams, a hearing-impaired woodcarver in Seattle, for
walking around the city with a piece of wood and his three-inch pocket
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knife.110 Neither the King County prosecutor (precluded because malice
could not be proven) nor the federal prosecutors (could not show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the officer “acted willfully and with the deliberate and
specific intent” to violate Williams’s civil rights) prosecuted the officer.111
However, the city did eventually settle with the family for $1.5 million.112
In terms of crowd control, the use of force becomes particularly
problematic. In Washington, to prosecute either gross misdemeanor or
felony riot requires a defendant—acting knowingly and unlawfully with
three or more people—to use, threaten to use, or participate in the use of
force against another person or property.113 The misdemeanor of “failure to
disperse” occurs when a person has been ordered to disperse by a police
officer or public servant and when the person “congregates with a group of
three or more other persons and there are acts of conduct within that group
which create a substantial risk of causing injury to any person, or
substantial harm to property” (emphasis added).114 The SPD Manual instead
frames dispersal in terms of “imminent” risk to a more amorphous concept
of “public safety.”115 In other words, there need not be a particular person or
property at risk of harm. This framing again puts the discretion more in the
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officers’ hands at the ground level, keeping in mind reasonableness of these
actions will be evaluated by a “reasonable officer” standard.116
This problematic phrasing does not always seem to have resulted in much
observable restraint. During the Occupy Seattle protests, SPD faced heavy
criticism for their crowd control tactics and use of force.117 On November
16, 2011, during a peaceful march that blocked downtown intersections,
officers reportedly pepper sprayed the protesters in the face, among them a
pregnant teenager who required hospitalization, a priest, and 84-year-old
Dorli Rainey.118 Then-Mayor Mike McGinn apologized for the incident
mere hours after Dorli Rainey’s photo garnered viral attention online.119
Later, in the Seattle May Day 2013 and 2014 protests, the police claimed to
have only taken action to arrest offenders after the crowd instigated either
property damage or pelted the police with rocks, bottles, or other objects.120
While some have commended SPD’s recent restraint, historically, others
have reported that once dispersion techniques begin, the police may
indiscriminately use force on an otherwise peaceful crowd with a few
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unruly members,121 or else the police unfairly target certain kinds of
demonstrators such as legal observers or the press.122
This last accusation, relating to targeting the press or people trying to
record police action, is especially challenging. The SPD Manual explicitly
states that retaliation is prohibited.123 Retaliation includes “discouragement,
intimidation, coercion, or adverse action against any person” engaging in
such lawful acts as exercising a constitutional right or recording incidents,
so this almost certainly includes pepper spray.124 Moreover, SPD has
explicitly adopted a Use of Force Policy that calls for “minimal reliance
upon the use of physical force” in all interactions with the public.125 The
measures exist, then, to try to prevent this kind of behavior. The more
difficult aspect seems to be compliance. Perhaps stricter enforcement of the
police’s own policies is required. Additionally, framing the use of force as a
last resort (using Peelian terms), rather than encouraging police to exert
force when the amorphous “public safety” is at risk, may result in fewer
clashes and better preserve both police-community relations and citizens’
rights to free speech and peaceful protest.
B. Uniform Changes to Create Uniform Change
Another very simple but effective change could be made just in the police
uniform. Currently, SPD’s standard uniform for officers consists of “French
Blue” (darker blue) uniform shirts, the “Anti-Crime” and SWAT teams
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wear black uniform shirts, and the bike teams wear black polo shirts.126
Even the simple change from dark and intimidating to a softer, pale blue
could have drastic positive effects on the police-community relationship.
Appearances are important, especially in the context of protest. Color
palette might be especially determinative. Some have suggested that “dark
police uniform may be subconsciously encouraging citizens to perceive
officers as aggressive[,] evil, or corrupt,” while “police officers in dark
uniforms may be subconsciously influenced to act more aggressively.”127
Increasingly, even in simple raids, police are dressing in “battle dress
uniforms” (BDUs) originally designed by the United States Army.128
From a psychological standpoint, dressing in military-style regalia can
have a clear effect on one’s attitude. “One tends to throw caution to the
wind when wearing ‘commando-chic’ regalia, a bulletproof vest with the
word ‘POLICE’ emblazoned on both sides, and when one is armed with
high tech weaponry.”129 This cuts both ways, as citizens are less likely to
see battle-dressed officers as individuals and more as cogs in a clockwork
government entity that cares little for whether the citizen is in the direct
path of its machinations. According to Salt Lake City Police Chief, Chris
Burbank:
Some say not using [riot gear] exposes my officers to a little bit
more risk. That could be, but risk is part of the job. I’m just
convinced that when we don riot gear, it says ‘throw rocks and
bottles at us.’ It invites confrontation. Two-way communication
126

SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, 2013 UNIFORM REFERENCE CATALOG 14, 19, 21 (2014),
available at
http://www.seattle.gov/police/publications/manual/documents/09_020_URC.pdf.
127
Richard R. Johnson, The Psychological Influence of the Police Uniform,
POLICEONE.COM (Mar. 4, 2005), http://www.policeone.com/policeproducts/apparel/undergear/articles/99417-The-psychological-influence-of-the-policeuniform/.
128
ACLU, supra note 2, at 22.
129
Id. (quoting retired police officer Bill Donnelly).

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Living Under the Boot

and cooperation are what’s important. If one side overreacts, then
it all falls apart.130
This is not a recent observation. In times of protest and civil unrest, it has
not been uncommon for police chiefs to put the more heavily-armored riot
control teams out of direct public sight, instead parked in buses and held in
reserve as back-up to a less intimidating police front.131 The theory is to put
up a front that is not directly antagonizing and that might incite less
violence from a crowd.132 More extreme methods have been attempted, as
when the Menlo Park Police Department in California changed their
paramilitary navy uniform to a “forest green sport coat blazer worn over
black slacks” in 1969.133 While resultant changes were likely not solely due
to the change of uniform, nonetheless, within 18 months of the uniform
change, psychological tests indicated the presence of less authoritarian
characteristics in the police force; “assaults on the Menlo Park police
decreased by 30 [percent], and injuries to civilians by the police dropped 50
[percent].”134
These types of police uniform reforms has typically failed for a few
reasons. One is that moving away from traditional uniforms could fail to
command requisite respect for police to perform their duties. In the Menlo
Park example, although there was an initial drop in civilian altercations, by
the time the department reverted to the paramilitary uniforms again eight
years later, assaults on the police were actually double what they had been
before the change, prompting the return to typical police uniform.135
Another reason police uniform reform has failed has been due to
pushback from police themselves. While the pseudo-military affectation is
130
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problematic on many levels to citizens who do not wish to feel as though
they are living in occupied territory, the feeling of authority that comes with
these trappings can be very compelling. Power, once acquired, may not be
relinquished; it instead creates a gnawing hunger for more of the like.
“[E]xperience hath shewn, that even under the best forms, those entrusted
with power have, in time, and by slow operations, perverted it into tyranny .
. . .”136 Our government was constructed partly with this maxim in mind, the
better to guard against its seemingly inevitable end. But rather than trying to
demand some form of respect through intimidation and increasingly brutal
uniforms, respect might be generated through the officers’ actions. As
peacekeepers and citizens themselves, police might have a care for the kind
of country they are creating and whether they actually want to live in a
nation where rural officers might walk around in full-body armor as if
preparing for war. We are not citizens of a Detroit-dystopia. RoboCop looks
cool, but we do not need him in our communities.
C. Reliable Reporting for Injuries and Deaths Related to Police Interaction
There is still a significant problem with police departments keeping
reliable records and reporting police use of force, both in Seattle and
nationally.137 Just having this kind of accountability might result in fewer
incidences of abuse of force or death of citizens. However, currently, what
amounts to “use of force” has no standard definition between one state and
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another.138 Jurisdictions are also not required to keep records on how often
use of force is implemented, or how many are shot or even die by police
action.139 Instead, LEAs self-report.140 Of over 17,000 LEAs in the country,
only around 750 (including Seattle) submit numbers, reporting
approximately 400 “justifiable homicides” by police officers per year.141 In
this context, “justifiable homicide” means the “killing of a felon by a law
enforcement officer in the line of duty.”142 The term “justifiable homicide”
is itself problematic as it presupposes first guilt and then conviction by
referring to the deceased as a “felon.” This data set also does not include
those killed who were not suspected felons and there is no listing for
“unjustified homicide.”143 Meanwhile, the DOJ estimated the number of
arrest-related deaths (for both alleged felonies and misdemeanors) at around
800 or so per year, although the report ceased collecting data in 2009
because the numbers were regarded as unreliable.144 In comparison,
nationwide in 2013, felonious incidents resulted in the deaths of 27 police
officers performing their duties; another 49 died through accidents, mainly
138
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owing to car crashes.145 Those numbers, reported to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), are presumably fairly accurate because the data is
collected from several sources, including
[c]ity, university and college, county, state, tribal, and federal law
enforcement agencies participating in the Uniform Crime
Reporting Program . . . [;] FBI field offices . . . [;] [and s]everal
nonprofit organizations, such as the Concerns of Police Survivors
and the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund,
which provide various services to the families of fallen officers. . .
. When the FBI receives notification of a line-of-duty death, the
Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA)
Program’s staff works with FBI field offices to contact the fallen
officer’s employing agency and request additional details about the
fatal incident. The LEOKA staff also obtains criminal history data
from the FBI’s Interstate Identification Index about individuals
who are identified in connection with line-of-duty felonious
deaths.146
Essentially, the FBI seems go to some lengths to keep accurate reports on
officer deaths, even with agencies that do not otherwise report.147 For nonfatal police violence against citizens—or even narrowed strictly to how
many people were shot by officers—no reliable or complete record
exists.148 The Center for Disease Control has stated that for the years 1999–
2013, 6,338 people died due to “legal intervention,” but only 32 states
participated.149 Other rough estimates given by independent groups are
145
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startlingly high.150 One source claims that in the first few months of 2015,
police officers caused a death every eight hours, on average.151 Recent
events have encouraged people to question why there have not been reliable
efforts by the government to compile numbers even on officer-related
homicides.152 This seems like a gross oversight and an enormous blind spot
in our justice system that may contribute to the lack of police
accountability.
However, Seattle has taken several steps that other jurisdictions might
emulate. SPD now keeps track of its use of force—in 2014, for the first
time, it collected standardized force data for a continuous six-month
period153—and it has begun releasing periodic reports on both the kind of
force required as well as the precipitating events requiring such force.154
SPD’s website has information available to citizens with internet access,
including its police manual, several reports relating to its use of force, and
an option for processing anonymous complaints online.155 The Office of
Accountability (OPA), headed by a mayor-appointed civilian who is
confirmed by the city council, oversees the complaints process.156 The OPA
documents the complaints and classifies them either by whether a
supervisor may address the complaint or whether a full misconduct
150
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investigation is required.157 If the findings are “not sustained,” the OPA
categorizes them as unfounded, lawful and proper, inconclusive, requiring a
training referral, or requiring management action.158 Note that the final two
categories still indicate that there was likely merit to the complaint.159 When
a training referral is required, the officer’s actions are not cause for
discipline because “while there may have been a violation of policy, it was
not a willful violation and/or the violation did not amount to misconduct,”
so training will suffice.160 When management action is required, no
individual officer is considered at fault because something was deficient in
SPD policy or procedure.161 Only sustained findings of misconduct, based
on a preponderance of the evidence, then go to the chief of police for
disciplinary action of an individual officer.162 The whole process takes 60–
180 days.163
The transparency of the process and SPD’s inclusion of civilian oversight
is a step in the right direction. SPD provides past OPA reports and
encourages citizens filing complaints to disclose their identities so that they
might receive notification regarding the status of the investigation as it
unfolds.164 Seattle’s current OPA director, Pierce Murphy, considers the
purpose of the OPA to answer the question “quis custodiet ipsos
custodies?” or, “who guards the guardsman?”; he believes that the OPA
functions as part of citizens’ First Amendment right to complain to the

157
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government.165 However, there are still some lingering problems. For one
thing, in Seattle, except for the OPA director, the auditor, and a civilian
deputy director, the majority of OPA staff are cops.166 This can create
something of both an image problem for complainants and a question of
loyalties for the officers involved in any jurisdiction where this is true.
Moreover, this process still seems to rely very heavily on internal police
discretion after the OPA has made its determination.167 If the complaint is
only classified under requiring supervisor action, the complaint might
effectively disappear into a black hole wherein a supervisor merely has a
conversation with the officer against whom the complaint was raised.168 The
reporting process thus relies on both the discretion and the supervisory
capacity of a superior who has already proved at least somewhat ineffective
in managing subordinates, as evidenced by the fact the subordinate’s actions
warranted a complaint.169 While it might prove effective in any individual
instance and a supervisor could very well impress the seriousness of the
situation on the officer, there is no systematic guarantee in the process.
Even if SPD conducts a full misconduct investigation and the complaint
sustained, this is not necessarily the end of the matter. The chief of police is
the only one who can discipline the offending officer.170 Affording only the
chief of police with disciplinary power might run into some of the same
aforementioned issues.171 Moreover, the chief of police may choose to
change a sustained finding to a not sustained finding if he or she writes a
letter to the mayor and city council explaining his or her reasoning.172 The
165
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chief of police does not have to write any such letter of explanation if
findings remain sustained but the chief of police chooses not to follow the
OPA’s recommended discipline.173 While some might argue that the chief
of police is entitled to deference in the management of the police
department, the OPA’s stated mission is to provide this kind of oversight
and advance accountability and public awareness,174 which could in turn
help create a transparent system promoting public confidence. If the final
disciplinary measures are still ultimately under internal control and
discretion, there is no guarantee that police will reform their behavior
adequately to suit the public need for police accountability.
Another wrinkle enters in when one considers the various protections in
the system for the officer against whom a complaint was made. Before
action is taken against an SPD officer on the basis of sustained findings, the
officer in question is owed a due process hearing with the chief of police.175
Even if the chief of police fully agrees with OPA’s sustained findings and
even its discipline recommendation, the chief’s word is not necessarily
final.176 After a discipline determination, the officer is also owed an appeals
process.177 If appealed with the Discipline Review Board, the chief’s
decision is reviewed by a three-panel board consisting of a police
management representative (typically a captain or assistant chief), a
representative from one of the police guilds, and one neutral third-party
arbitrator.178 Essentially, the review comes from a board where the majority
are cops.179 This board then has the power to overturn the chief’s discipline
decision, reducing or eliminating it entirely, and it can even overturn the
173
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original sustained findings.180 The city can still appeal the review board’s
decision to the courts, but this option is often too costly to pursue.181
A few easy solutions on how to handle police complaints seem to present
themselves. Seattle, and other cities like it, could change some elements of
their OPA. For instance, chiefs of police could be forced to make an
accounting for why they might refuse to follow OPA discipline
recommendations, similar to how they might need to explain their reasoning
for reversing a sustained finding. This increases accountability, helps ensure
deviations from OPA discipline recommendation are only done for good
reason, could create greater faith in the complaints system from citizens
who feel that proper civilian oversight is present, and overall might
encourage chiefs to follow civilian oversight directions in discipline
matters. The Seattle OPA director has also indicated that he thinks having
more civilians working in the OPA as investigators might improve
accountability and trust in the system.182 This could work in a few ways.
While this might involve having to find money to pay for these new
positions, they could possibly take the salaries currently paid to cops in the
same position, or the department could enlist civilian volunteers. However,
no matter the route taken, anyone allowed to work as an OPA investigator
should probably be thoroughly vetted and qualified to hold the position.
Moreover, it is likely unnecessary to eliminate officer presence in the OPA
entirely, especially as they are likely to be both qualified and
knowledgeable about various police procedures and can be a good source of
information for the office. Other changes that might help the OPA process
include overhauling the current discipline review process so that a police
management representative and a police guild representative do not make
up the majority of a three-panel board and thus effectively act as the
180
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ultimate gatekeepers for police discipline. However, this might prove
difficult if police guilds choose to resist the change.
Another solution would be for Washington and other states to implement
laws that would force officers to publicly account for every bullet they fire.
While SPD’s use of force is now broadly documented, public access to
records on when and how many shots are fired does not appear to be easily
accessible.183 Bullets are likely be easily countable by how many have been
requested and issued to each officer. If one bullet is fired at—or ends up
in—a citizen, it would seemingly be a very simple task to report it and have
those numbers available to the public in a database the same way as
tracking officers killed in the line of duty or other crime reports are
generated.184 While opponents might argue that a new database for bullets
increases the amount of paperwork, much of the documentation is already
required when officers write their incident reports. Adding a formal
database just requires essentially generating a separate table. Moreover, a
bullet inventory seems like a fairly important thing to keep track of.
Similarly, Washington could require officers to report when an encounter
with an officer results in a death. Although some LEAs do report use of
force, this is at the LEAs’ discretion, not by state or federal mandate.185 At
the federal level, the current “justifiable homicide” measurement used by
the FBI is similarly self-reported at the participating LEAs’ discretion and
still fails to account for deaths during the course of misdemeanors or
accidental deaths.186 While there may be some murky areas where the actual
matter is unclear—as when a suspect has a heart attack while police are in
pursuit, or if a suspect is shot but dies weeks later—for the most part,
knowing the cause of death also seems like it could be a fairly simple matter
183
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involving a very basic understanding of causation. Requiring LEAs to
report use of force, rather than permitting them to report at their discretion,
seems like a reasonable step.
Additionally, Washington could require reporting whenever the use of
force extends to tools such as pepper spray, nightsticks, and other non-lethal
uses of force, again emulating SPD. Such regulations might require almost
entirely self-reporting methods and cannot be as accurately measured as
bullets discharged, but, primarily, society would have to trust officers to
largely be truthful in their reports. Having this kind of statistic could be
enormously useful for the public to measure police use of force.
There will still likely be some problems in reporting for all of these
suggestions. If funding and public approval become tied to these numbers,
LEAs might also feel pressure to be less accurate in their reporting. Even
so, this would still produce more accurate numbers than we currently have.
Moreover, it may influence some LEAs to use less force and have fewer
fatal encounters to keep public opinion high. Given that SPD has already
implemented many of these measures, it might be used as a model with a bit
more reform, especially in how it implements discipline. The next section
will address additional discipline concerns.
D. Stricter Sanctions for Complaints of Excessive Force and Assault:
Holding Officers Accountable for Public and Private Actions
Police departments in general may also do a better job of “self-policing”
when officers are faced with allegations of using excessive force against
someone, either while on the job or in the offices’ private lives. SPD
currently relies on a reporting process described in the last section that
ultimately leaves the discretion of discipline in the hands of the chief of
police.187 Departments could issue sanctions, suspend officers, dock pay,
initiate transfers, or simply fire the officers, which are options SPD already
187
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has at its disposal.188 However, these sanctions might need more rigorous
enforcement and implementation by a body wholly outside the police force,
possibly with a point system for more egregious complaints.
One suggestion for a disciplinary mechanism is relying on a point
system. For instance, each officer could receive 10 points for the entirety of
his or her career with the department. Successive sustained complaints
could result in greater sanctions by a pre-determined guideline, with the end
being termination of employment. The system could admittedly create some
unjust results based on an officer’s popularity, issues in the complaint
process, or past mistakes. This new system might also suffer if it still relied
on the current OPA complaint system to make a finding of a sustained
complaint. There may be additional difficulties in implementation if the
chief of police instead has discretion in this regard, as those in charge may
want to protect their own. For this system to work, it may require
eliminating discretion.
Relying on a point system may ultimately seem like a drastic measure,
but it may have to come to this to root out those “bad apples.” While one
report stated that citizens felt that 9 out of 10 interactions with the police
were proper, when force was used, the majority of respondents felt it was
excessive.189 The DOJ found there was in fact a pattern or practice of
unnecessary or excessive use of force in the case of SPD.190 It seems
unlikely this policy change would result in much abuse from the public, as
higher and unavoidable sanctions would likely impact police interactions
with the public to cut down on the use of force altogether. Even now, with
current use of force, less than seven complaints occur every year per 100
188
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officers across the nation.191 Whether or not officers used force in any
individual instance to the degree that it would result in criminal conviction
or civil penalty, the public perception of abuse of power should still be
persuasive to a police department that intends to make changes for the
better, as SPD has committed to do.
Accusations of use of force or assault should be taken just as seriously
outside of the line of duty. The issue is not only the abuse of power while
on the job, but also a pervasive problem with disregard to the rights and
personal safety of others. Police departments should not employ officers
who act in assaultive or aggressive ways in their private lives.
Unfortunately, it seems that certain types of violence are common in the
profession.192 It should be noted that “violence” is a general term, only a
few studies on the matter exist, and figures come largely by self-report and
not from how many charges or complaints have actually been filed against
the officer.193 Accusations of violence in police officers’ private lives goes
beyond the scope of this paper. However, violent tendencies as a whole are
pertinent to the issue of excessive use of force while on duty. It seems it
would be in a department’s best interest to use complaints of force and
191
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assault while both on- and off-duty (as measured by whether it occurred in
the context of the fulfilling job requirements) in their calculations when
deciding to sanction or fire an officer. This may be of particular concern if
an attitude of violence may be affecting decisions for official use of force.
E. Body-Worn Videos: Watching the Watchmen
Another strategy police could use to better protect citizens’ rights is to
implement the use of body-worn video devices (BWVs). Placed on the
officer’s clothing or sunglasses, these cameras provide both video and audio
evidence of police-civilian interactions.194 They may be especially useful in
the context of a protest, when events may be prone to confusion, when tear
gas may have driven away reporters and others with recording devices, and
where the police would presumably have some of the best vantage points to
see events unfold at the ground level. Moreover, having so many police in a
single place, all wearing the same equipment, would make the events
documentable from multiple angles, making for a firm record of events.
According to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, jurisdictions
that used BWVs “enhanced officer safety, improved agency accountability,
and reduced agency liability” for the police department, while making
officers more mindful of following protocols in line with citizens’
constitutional rights.195 Tamperproof BWVs worn on the officers’ persons
could create greater accountability to the public, cut down on spurious
claims of excessive use of force, and be useful evidence in the case of legal
action as documentation of the officers’ procedures.196
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Police forces have already successfully used BWVs. For instance, in the
United Kingdom, BWVs allowed officers to record accurate evidence in
real time, let the officers make quick records to resolve cases more rapidly,
and gave detailed records when the investigation called for reviewing the
officer’s actions.197 Here in the United States, hundreds of police
departments, including Cincinnati, Ohio, and San Diego, California, have
also purchased and used BWVs to some success.198 For the most part, the
public seems in favor of the program, perhaps somewhat spurred by
accusations of police brutality and excessive use of force.199 For instance, in
Birmingham, citizen complaints have dropped 71 percent while their police
department’s use of force has dropped 38 percent.200 Moreover, even human
rights groups and government watch-dog websites seem in favor of BWVs
as a method of guarding against government abuse, so long as the BWVs do
not become just another method for routine government surveillance.201
So far, SPD has issued around 12 BWVs to officers, and SPD is looking
into how to blur the faces of those stored in its database to potentially
protect the privacy of individuals.202 Officers volunteered to participate in
the BWV Pilot Program.203 These volunteers completed SPD’s BWV
training received checklists on pre-shift function checks on the cameras,
197
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police activities to record, and reasons for which they might review the
body-worn video.204 SPD also ordered them to continue recording until an
event had concluded, to notify people they were being recorded “as soon as
practical,” to document the existence of a video or lack thereof, to enter data
for recorded events, and to upload the videos before the end of the shift.205
Redacted videos recorded in phase 1 of the city’s plan are available
online.206 Seattle Police Chief Kathleen O’Toole has publicly stated that
“the jury’s out” on whether SPD will issue BWVs to all of its officers.207
However, some sources indicate Chief O’Toole has since expressed support
for “deployment of body-worn video cameras on every one of Seattle’s
600+ patrol officers.”208 Pre-Ferguson, SPD held a meeting concerning
police accountability and SPD seemed willing to entertain the idea of using
BWVs if the privacy concerns were also considered.209 SPD has also voiced
concerns about effective cost measurements and how to cope with the
enormous amount of data from the cameras to be stored.210A full review on
BWVs is expected sometime in the fall of 2015.211
For BWVs to be effective, police departments need to consider when and
how the cameras would function. The recordings would have to be both
dependable and tamperproof to ensure their usefulness.212 One method for
the recording procedure could be having officers turn on the cameras
204
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whenever they interact with a civilian.213 However, it seems like this
method would face some problems. Sometimes an officer may forget to
trigger the camera’s use, either due to a memory lapse or in the heat of the
moment. Valuable evidence—which could be used to prove or disprove a
claim made regarding a police-citizen interaction—could be lost this way.
An officer may also willfully refuse to turn on the BWV, despite
regulations, and claim human error. Police departments may also claim the
operator forgot to turn on the camera just to cover evidence if the video
shows clearly erroneous conduct. While most police officers are lawabiding citizens who would never do such a thing, making the video
dependent on the officers’ initiation leaves the system open to these kinds
of abuses.214
Another method could be that the camera would turn on whenever an
officer’s emergency equipment, such as lights or sirens, is activated, similar
to how the camera on many TASER devices begins to record when it is
released from its dock.215 However, this method also has its failings. If the
camera were tied to the activation of the police car’s lights or sirens, there
would be no recording in the case of a spontaneous emergency that begins
outside the vehicle, as when an officer is having a face-to-face conversation
with a person on the street. This system also fails to account for officers
who do not have a police car.
A preferred method might simply be to have the cameras operating from
the moment the police officer puts on his or her uniform, uploading every
recording either remotely or at the end of the officer’s shift in a main library
at the department headquarters.216 This method will produce significantly
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more data, but present technology seems capable of coping with the
burden.217
Requiring police departments to use BWVs could face some problems in
implementation. Police have shown some resistance to what they see as an
intrusion on their privacy rights.218 However, the benefits of BWVs seem to
outweigh the costs. BWVs may help police-civilian interactions by
increasing public trust in the legal system, giving an unbiased record of
events to help support officers’ claims, making officers more mindful of the
constitutional rights of the citizens they are interacting with, and putting
everyone on their best behavior for the camera.219 According to one police
chief, the “only officers who would have a problem with body cameras are
bad officers.”220
Opponents assert, however, that BWVs are simply not a good enough
solution to the problem and that they might, at best, be considered a “BandAid.”221 Even when an entire interaction between police and citizens is
being recorded, many claim that the officers are not deterred from excessive
use of force.222 On July 17, 2014, Eric Garner—an unarmed black man and
a father of six—died while being held in a departmentally-prohibited
chokehold by New York Police Department officers arresting him for
allegedly selling “loose” (non-taxed) cigarettes.223 Mr. Garner’s last words,
217
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repeated until his dying breath, were, “I can’t breathe. I can’t breathe.”224 A
bystander recorded the entire incident and his death received national
attention, and yet, even with the video, none of the officers involved in Mr.
Garner’s homicide were indicted.225 The failure to even indict, while there
is full video evidence of departmentally-prohibited conduct and a resultant
death, gives credence to the argument that police behavior will not change
just because they are being recorded. It indicates police might still be
untouchable, and so there is no incentive to alter their behavior if they will
never face punishment. As a counter to this, however, some of the officers
involved might not have known they were being recorded. If officers had to
wear BWVs and knew the camera was rolling, this still might be enough to
convince at least some officers to scale back the use of force.
Fear of increased government surveillance may be another source of
resistance for using BWVs. This issue might best develop through case law,
where courts can determine specific examples of how and where the
surveillance intrudes on privacy rights. While having running cameras
mounted on officers who may be interacting with people during very
stressful, intimidating, or painful moments of citizens’ lives does raise
privacy concerns, the protection of civil liberties by recording police
interactions might be worth this somewhat lesser invasion.226 Moreover, the
police need to interact with people while on duty, and BWVs are a way to
keep an accurate record of that interaction. The privacy invasion could be
minimized by limiting the cameras to uniformed police or have the police
announce that their interaction is being recorded.227 SPD is considering
requiring consent to record while inside a private area, and it is looking into
ways to redact certain images and information.228 SPD has explored
224
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redaction methods through blurring all of the images or using outlines.229
While this may generate some censorship concerns, the primary interest
seems to be in blurring or blocking faces to protect citizens’ identities.230
There have also been suggestions that, unless the data is flagged, it should
be deleted within a few weeks.231 There may be dangers associated with this
proposal, however, as it might make it easier for police to fail to flag
particularly incriminating evidence—as in the case of blatant brutality—and
then claim there was an error. If anything, the sheer volume of data might
be the best protection for citizens’ privacy, as it is unlikely that anyone
would have the time or inclination to go through all of that voluminous
data. At minimum, police departments should consider using BWVs during
protests, where the public format should at least resolve some privacy
concerns as citizens have a lowered expectation for privacy in such a
context. Ultimately, where BWVs have been implemented, the benefits
have the potential to outweigh the costs, although it might take some time to
decide whether any protocols need to be changed.232
Finally, some might argue the cost of implementing this plan is too large.
The cost of a single BWV could range between $300 and $400, which could
cause a large police department to go bankrupt.233 Storage costs for the data
collected could also be a major issue, with one police department citing
over a million dollars in estimated storage expenses.234 However, as noted
previously, police departments have access to DoD equipment through very
little effort, as well as large amounts of anti-terrorism funds through the
Department of Homeland Security grants. Also, the unit cost of a single
229
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M16 rifle, transferred from the DoD through the 1033 Program, is $499,
which the police department has nonetheless abundantly invested.235
Moreover, the cost per camera might decrease if BWVs were more
prevalent because they would have to be mass-produced, which would drive
down the costs. Some of the storage expenses could also be alleviated by
looking to other methods of storage or by developing a procedure for
deleting unnecessary footage after some period. Alternatively, departments
might alleviate some of the financial burden if only certain officers wore
BWVs, or if officers only wore them during protests. Also, litigation costs
might decrease with BWV evidence by spurring more settlements or simply
dropping clearly spurious claims, so the money saved might account for the
cameras’ purchase.236 Lastly, President Obama recently announced a plan to
expend $75 million to equip 50,000 police officers nationwide with BWVs,
with the intention of creating a $265 million three-year initiative focusing
on police training and reform.237 This program is supposed to be included in
the 2015 budget, with an ultimate goal of providing a 50 percent federal
match for any department buying BWVs.238 Therefore, even if cost is an
issue, LEAs that are unable or unwilling to equip themselves with BWVs
may nonetheless be provided with the cameras.
F. Banning or Limiting Washington Police Departments’ Ownership of
Assaultive Military-Grade Weaponry
Washington State could also simply ban or severely limit LEA ownership
of military-grade weaponry. One of the largest outcries against the current
interaction between police and protesters has been police using military235
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grade weapons and equipment during protests, such as tanks, armored
trucks, and full-body armor.239 Reportedly, President Obama is currently
working on an executive order addressing review and supervision standards
for acquiring military-grade equipment.240 The United States House of
Representatives recently proposed the Stop Militarizing Law Enforcement
Act, which would largely dismantle the current 1033 Program and decrease
funding offered by Homeland Security, making it much more difficult for
police departments to acquire military-grade weapons.241 According to Raúl
Labrador, who co-wrote the bill, “Our nation was founded on the principle
of a clear line between the military and civilian policing . . . . The
Pentagon’s current surplus property program blurs that line by introducing a
military model of overwhelming force in our cities and towns.”242 If
successful, the Stop Militarizing Law Enforcement Act would require LEAs
to certify that they have the personnel, technical capacity, and training to
operate the property, that they will return the surplus property if the need
for it has passed, that they will not transfer certain types of equipment from
one federal or state agency to another, that they will maintain a website with
a description of the transferred equipment, and that they will alert local
communities to the property requests.243 The act would also bar LEAs from
using certain types of equipment, “including high-caliber weapons, sound
cannons, grenades, grenade launchers and certain armored vehicles.”244
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While it seems unlikely the proposed bill will succeed in the House, after
the events in Ferguson, Missouri, President Obama has still ordered a
review of federal programs—like the 1033 Program—which provide LEAs
with military-grade weapons.245 The review, reportedly, will look not only
to whether this type of equipment should be given to local law enforcement
at all, but also look to whether the LEAs have been trained in the safety,
use, and maintenance of the equipment.246
Washington could propose its own legislation to much the same effect.
Like the proposed act, Washington could bar LEAs from requesting certain
transfers from the DoD. For the most part, high-caliber weapons, armored
vehicles, and all types of grenades seem largely excessive for local law
enforcement. Washington could also put a monetary limit on how much
funding local and state LEAs may accept from the federal government,
capping it using an algorithm of need as based on the population the LEA
serves. However, it should be noted that the 1033 Program is still a useful
resource for local police with legitimate and helpful purposes. Its use should
continue in a limited manner. For instance, it seems reasonable that LEAs
continue to be able to requisition DoD property like computers, office
supplies, BWVs, and other non-combat-related surplus equipment.247 While
police departments may need some combat equipment, it seems reasonable
that the kind and expense of such possessions should be proportional to the
particular agency’s budget as determined by local taxes.
This proposal might face several critiques. Police departments will be
loath to give up their federal money or military-grade equipment in any
capacity, if the rampant stockpiling has been any indication.248 Moreover,
one could argue that the funding and equipment help the police perform
245
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their jobs more efficiently and safely without overburdening the citizens in
their locality. The reduction of crime should be a priority, and police should
have the funds to accomplish this task. However, it appears that the tie to
federal funds or equipment might have nothing to do with protecting
citizens from crime, “and in fact, successfully fighting crime could hurt a
department’s ability to rake in federal money,” because grants are more
likely to go to high-crime areas.249 Ultimately, law enforcement is becoming
a business where the end is to acquire more funding to hire more personnel,
acquire better equipment, and conduct more raids and crack-downs for
(usually minor or drug-related) offenses.250 The protection of citizens seems
to have very little to do with it. Sense seems to have very little to do with it.
G. Limiting the Accepted Methods of Non-lethal Crowd Control
Finally, police departments could limit the accepted methods of nonlethal crowd control altogether. SPD has taken steps in the right direction by
clearly outlining specific policies for its force tools, such as beanbag
shotguns and canine deployment, but reform is still necessary at both a local
and national scale.251 In particular, police departments should discontinue
using chemical agents such as tear gas and pepper spray. Tear gas may
contain either the chemical chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) or
chloroacetophenone (CN, sometimes referred to as “mace”), while pepper
spray often contains chili peppers mixed with corn oil.252 Both tear gas and
pepper spray are part of a class of chemical weapons in the category of
lachrymatory agents, and in fact, the same company usually makes them
249
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and sometimes even combines them into the same product.253 The term
“non-lethal” relates to the intent for use; tear gas is not meant to kill those
afflicted with it as it is “generally considered to have only short term
consequences.”254 This does not mean that tear gas is incapable of killing.255
Although the purpose of tear gas and pepper spray is only to activate painsensing nerves by irritating mucus membranes, the health effects of tear gas
may be long-reaching and severe, including pulmonary concerns, as well as
damage to the eyes, heart, and other organs, with some populations being
more at risk than others.256 In some cases, tear gas exposure causes
miscarriages, and tear gas canister explosions result in amputations.257
Moreover, the international community has largely condemned tear gas as
inhumane, and the Chemical Weapons Convention has banned it during
wartimes.258
Technological developments continue to provide more humane
alternatives for non-lethal force. For instance, conductive energy devices
(CEDs) such as TASERs have become more commonly used in the United
States, with over 140,000 units issued across the country.259 Although CEDs
have also faced criticism for potential health risks due to fatalities, creators
253
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of this technology are still developing it and seeking safer non-lethal
methods to subdue suspects.260 Also, CEDs are more effective against single
perpetrators and cannot be used by police officers to indiscriminately
blanket a crowd. While officers may need to control crowds at times, CEDs
could enable them to use force on a few unruly individuals early on without
affecting peaceful protestors as well.
Opponents might argue that these aggressive forms of crowd control are
necessary to keep order and make sure police officers are safe. However,
police officers’ jobs are actually already fairly safe and are getting safer.261
The homicide rate for police officers in 2010 was 7.9 per 100,000 officers,
and “2012 was the safest year for police officers since the 1950s.”262
Reportedly, 2013 saw the fewest officers killed by firearms since 1887, and
was again the lowest year for police fatalities since 1959.263 Also in 2013,
the last year the FBI compiled data as of the time of this writing, 76 officers
died in line-of-duty events, and only 27 of those deaths were the result of
felonious acts; the rest were accidents.264 For any given year, it is estimated
that citizens will feloniously kill between 9 and 12 per 100,000 officers.265
Admittedly, this national average is higher than the homicide rate of Seattle
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in 2012 (2.3 per 100,000 people).266 However, this is drastically lower than
the homicide rate in 2010 for cities like St. Louis (40.5 per 100,000 people),
Kansas City (21.1 per 100,000 people), or Atlanta (17.3 per 100,000
people).267 A person is “more likely to be murdered just by living in these
cities than the average American police officer is to be murdered on the
job.”268 In terms of professions, in 2014, loggers had a fatality rate of
around 109.5 per 100,000 full-time workers, followed by fishers and related
fish workers at 80.9 per 100,000 full-time workers, pilots and flight
engineers at 63.2 per 100,000 full-time workers, and roofers are at 46.2 per
100,000 full-time workers.269 Police officers did not even make the top-ten
list.270 It is unclear why this might be; although it is possible that police
militarization itself may be why officers are safer; at this point, that is
merely a correlation and pure speculation. In either case, currently there is
little evidence indicating that police officers are justified in using this level
of force indiscriminately against a crowd just to keep police safe.
Even if police officers still need access to non-lethal weapons usable
against whole crowds at once, there are still alternatives to chemical
warfare. Although the FBI reports that violent crime is the lowest it has
been since the 1970s,271 arguably there are times when a crowd requires
dispersal not only for the officers’ safety, but also for the safety of citizens
and property. In these instances, police might still use devices like the Long
266
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Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) “sound cannon,” which broadcasts
“deterrent” tones that can transmit 162 dB from five-and-a-half miles
away.272 For reference, humans experience discomfort in decibel ranges
around 120 dB, with hearing loss possible around the 130 dB-level.273 As
such, sounds at this level can be painful and headache inducing, and with
misuse or abuse, LRADs may cause permanent hearing loss.274 Based on a
few comments by Police Chief O’Toole, this is not currently a favored
method for SPD.275 The LRADs themselves can cost from $5,000 to almost
$190,000 each.276 Moreover, just based on their design, LRADs and their
ilk are indiscriminate for use against both peaceful and rowdy protestors,
potentially dissuading all forms of protest. However, it still might be
preferable to assault protestors with sound waves than to damage lifesustaining organs, as occurs when one is affected by tear gas. A lifelong
disability is a severe risk, and there may be a danger for abuse, but at least
vital organs like the heart and lungs are not being specifically targeted.
Devices like the LRAD “sound cannon” are still far from perfect, but they
seem like a step in the right direction, and the development of better and
safer technology in a similar vein would likely pick up by a ban on
chemical agents.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The extensive militarization of our local and state police forces poses a
very real and cognizable threat to citizens’ civil liberties. In the context of
peaceful protest, police militarization primarily presents itself as overblown
and unnecessary, while also showing just how easy abuse can be with this
amount of power. The stress of a military-like scheme that puts the police
force in the mind of “warriors,” rather than as peacekeepers or guardians of
the people, sets police and citizens as opponents and makes civilians into
“the enemy.” The ultra-authoritarian viewpoint polarizes police and
civilians, and those attracted to police work in this climate begin to see any
act or stand against the affiliated government as a threat to the officers’
(citizen-granted) authority. As such, the climate for clashes and danger for
abuse is never higher than during times of protest. Having taken the script
from the WTO protests, the modern police force—and SPD as an example
of both its problems and its possibility for reform—has chosen to take the
path towards control rather than the path towards safeguarding the rights of
protestors to gather peacefully in dramatic demonstrations against a
government action, little realizing that “[t]here is no final one; revolutions
are infinite.”277 Denied their rights to peacefully protest, a desperate people
will still always find a way be heard, often not so peacefully.
This is a nation-wide issue, but change needs to initiate at a local level. If
SPD has a real commitment to change, to eliminate accusations of patterns
of abuse, and especially to protect the people’s rights during protest, the
police can make several changes relating to how they interact with the
public, manage their own personnel, and increase accountability for their
actions. With only a few changes, such as switching the uniform color,
using BWVs, changing the discipline process, and banning tear gas, SPD
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can once again be a model to the nation, this time for the proper way to
manage a police force in answer to protest.
The right of the masses to speak in a public format to express their
dissatisfaction is a critical liberty that requires safeguarding. It is a staple of
our nation’s political process, and a right rooted in the very start of our
nation. The militarization of the police and the propagated policies that
inevitably lead to clashes with these armored, battle-dressed pseudo-soldiers
in city streets acts as a direct damper to that sentiment. The people have the
right to a public voice to express political satisfaction, and by keeping that
combat-boot firmly stamped on the faces of protestors, we risk the
possibility of silencing that voice forever.
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